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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 29, 1999 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, decided Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
1
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co, which has proven to be one of its most
controversial decisions in the Federal Circuit’s almost twenty years
of existence. Festo holds that a claim limitation that is amended for
patentability purposes during prosecution, which narrows the
scope of any claim containing that limitation is entitled to no range
2
3
of equivalents under the doctrine of equivalents. Equivalents are
no longer available in many instances because it was very common,
in the past, for practitioners to amend the pending claims in a
patent application during prosecution to secure an allowance. The
use of so-called means-plus-function claim language may preserve
the availability of some equivalents when none are otherwise
4
available under the doctrine of equivalents.
In Festo, the Federal Circuit based its holding, in part, on
5
prosecution history estoppel. One of the most basic public policies
6
underlying prosecution history estoppel is the policy of notice.
Notice requires that the public receive clear information on the
scope of a given patent’s claims. However, the patent laws of the
United States permit a particular type of claim form, means-plusfunction, which inherently does not provide the public with clear

1. 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2519 (June 18,
2001).
2. See id. at 574.
3. The court, in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,
609 (1950), stated the following:
In determining equivalents, things equal to the same thing may not be
equal to each other and, by the same token, things for most purposes
different may sometimes be equivalents. Consideration must be given to
the purpose for which an ingredient is used in a patent, the qualities it
has when combined with the other ingredients, and the function which it
is intended to perform. An important factor is whether persons
reasonably considered in the art would have known of the
interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one
that was.
4. A “literal” equivalent is different than an equivalent under the doctrine of
equivalents. See Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Int’l Trading Co., 203 F.3d 1362, 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
5. Festo, 234 F.3d at 574.
6. “[T]he notice function of patent claims has become paramount, and the
need for certainty as to the scope of patent protection has been emphasized.” Id.
at 575.
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7

notice of a patent claim’s scope.
Means-plus-function claim limitations may evade the notice
principles because the scope of means-plus-function claim
limitations encompasses a range of equivalents as a matter of law.
Presumably, means-plus-function claim limitations include
equivalents even when equivalents would not be otherwise available
because of estoppel.
Section 112, paragraph six, of the patent statute provides
8
language for a means-plus-function claim. Following the addition
of paragraph six in the 1952 Patent Act, the courts were left to
determine several issues: (1) the scope of claimed structural
embodiments; (2) equivalent evaluations; (3) the permissible scope
of anticipatory art; and (4) the effect of estoppel considerations on
the range of claimed embodiments. The Federal Circuit has
provided practitioners with a substantial body of case law on the
first three issues. However, the Federal Circuit has not provided
much guidance on the fourth issue. Moreover, it is unknown
9
whether the reasoning applied in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu, which bars
the application of the doctrine of equivalents in a majority of cases,
will have any effect on the range of literal equivalents included in
means-plus-function claims.
This article begins by briefly reciting the Federal Circuit’s
position on the first three issues above and then provides a
background for analysis of the fourth issue. sections two and three
illustrate the patent system and explain the important public policy
behind notice, including some background on the purpose of
section 112, paragraph six. sections four and five are a digest of the
means-plus-function infringement analysis. This digest provides a
context for the closing sections, six and seven, which examine the
Federal Circuit’s application of both argument estoppel and
amendment (Festo) estoppel to means-plus-function claim
7. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (2001) states:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or
step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure,
material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to
cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the
specification and equivalents thereof.
8. Id.
9. “The application of a complete bar to the doctrine of equivalents
whenever a claim amendment gives rise to prosecution history estoppel similarly
reduces the conflict and tension between the patent protection afforded by the
doctrine of equivalents and the public’s ability to ascertain the scope of a patent.”
Festo, 234 F.3d at 577.
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limitations. Section seven concludes with arguments for and against
these applications.
II. PATENTS ARE LIKE REAL ESTATE: AN ANALOGY
It is helpful to visualize the universe of all patentable subject
matter as a large piece of real estate. Each patent is defined by the
fence around smaller portions of the initial piece of land. The
fence itself is the periphery of the claimed subject matter contained
within the fence. A patent applicant fences off a portion of territory
with the fence to signify ownership of that portion of real estate
and to indicate the scope of claimed subject matter to potential
10
infringers. In short, the patent defines the boundary of the patent
claim’s coverage or scope. Therefore, patent owners naturally
desire to fence off the largest possible territory.
The patent office performs a regulatory function by following
certain procedures and protocols to ensure that patent applicants
do not claim more territory than they are entitled. Typically, an
applicant finds that she or he is limited by the placement of
neighboring fences. In that situation, the patent office essentially
determines that these fences are too close to each other, and it uses
11
sections 102 and 103 of the patent statutes to reject the patent
application.
The applicant typically responds to the examiner’s rejections
by amending his claims or attempting to traverse the rejections.
Amending the claims is analogous to moving the applicant’s fences.
Traversing a rejection is analogous to arguing about the location of
the fences. After one or more iterations of amendments and/or
traverses, the examiner may allow a patent.
The public first receives notice of a patent when it is
12
published. After publication, the file history, containing all the
10. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1530 n.2
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Charles Eliot Mitchell, Commissioner of Patents, An
address Delivered at the Proceedings of the Congress on the “Birth & Growth of the American
Patent System” (1890), reprinted in PATENT CENTENNIAL CELEBRATION PROCEEDINGS
AND ADDRESSES, 52 (1891)) and in Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and
the Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 759, 759 (1999)).
11. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2001) (outlining conditions for patentability, novelty,
and loss of right to patent); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2001) (outlining conditions for
patentability and non-obvious subject matter).
12. Under the American Inventor’s Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113 [§
4502(a)], there are now provisions in place for eighteen-month publication of
pending applications. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2001). However, one may still elect not
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amendments and arguments, also becomes public record. After
reviewing the record, one may find that the applicant disclaimed
some of the potential coverage or territory by arguing or
narrowingly amending the claims to avoid the examiner’s
rejections. The public can then rely on these limiting statements
when making infringement assessments.
III. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION LIMITATIONS
Section 112 of the patent statute provides limitation on meansplus-function claims. In 1952, Congress added paragraph six to
section 112 to provide that a claim for a combination may be
expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function,
without the recital of structure, material or acts in support
14
thereof. This addition was likely in direct response to the United
State Supreme Court’s decision in Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co.
15
v. Walker, which invalidated patent claims containing “means”
16
language because they were indefinite. Some believe that
Congressional intent in adding paragraph six was to codify the
17
judicially created equitable doctrine of equivalents. Alternatively,
to publish under certain circumstances. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2) (2001).
13. See 37 C.F.R. 1.14(c)(2) ("A copy of the specification, drawings, and all
papers relating to the file of an abandoned or published application may be
provided to any person upon written request, including the fee set forth in §
1.19(b)(2).").
14. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (2001) states as follows:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or
step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure,
material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to
cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the
specification and equivalents thereof.
15. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946).
16. Halliburton involved an apparatus designed to facilitate the pumping of oil
out of wells that do not have sufficient natural pressures to force the oil to gush.
Id. at 3. The patent at issue provided an apparatus composed of old and wellknown devices to measure the time required for pressure waves to move to and
back from the fluid surface of an oil well. Id. at 4-5. However, the patent used
“means” language rather than physical characteristics or arrangement to describe
the new matter. Id. at 8. The court goes on to state the following:
The language of the claim thus describes this most crucial element in the
“new” combination in terms of what it will do rather than in terms of its
own physical characteristics or its arrangement in the new combination
apparatus. We have held that a claim with such a description of a product
is invalid . . ..
Halliburton, 329 U.S at 9.
17. See Julia Hodge, § 112, ¶ 6 Claim Interpretation and the Doctrine of
Equivalents: An Invitation to Confused Thinking, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
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it may be that Congress was merely bowing to the pressure of
interested parties such as industry and patent attorneys seeking to
maintain the viability of functional claims.
Pasquale Federico, the primary author of the Patent Act of
1952, described the act as follows:
It is unquestionable that some measure of greater
liberality in the use of functional expressions in
combinations claims is authorized than had been
permitted by some court decisions, and that the decisions
such as that in Halliburton are modified or rendered
obsolete, but the exact limits of the enlargement remain
18
to be determined.
Arguably, the language of the statute Congress enacted
providing means-plus-function claim limitations has restricted the
scope of claimed structural embodiments. However, over the last
fifty years, the courts’ treatment of these claim limitations and
scope restrictions has been wide-ranging. Initially, the courts took a
very broad view of the scope of structures covered by means-plus19
function claim limitations. In D.M.I. v. Deere, the Federal Circuit
reversed the lower court’s ruling of non-infringement, holding that
a functional claim was not limited to the exact structure described
20
in the patent specification. The Federal Circuit held that the
patentee must disclose some enabling means for accomplishing the
claimed function and that there is no requirement that an
applicant describe or predict every possible means of
21
accomplishing that function. The period following the D.M.I.
decision is appropriately considered the heyday of the means-plusTECH L.J. 203, 221 (2000). Hodge supports her theories with the statements of
Judge Bryson: “[a]ll the elements of a combination now will be able to be claimed
in terms of what they do as well as in terms of what they are . . . . This provision
also gives recognition to the existence of the doctrine of equivalents.” Id. at 220.
The author also cites statements of L. James Harris, patent counsel for the drafting
committee, “[i]t was felt by the drafters that means claims should be permitted in
combination claims . . . to provide for the proper interpretation of the claims
commensurate with the invention, the doctrine of equivalents is specifically
mentioned in the section.” Id.
18. Pasquale J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 75 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y. 161, 186 (1993).
19. See D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
20. “[N]o estoppel can arise which may restrict the broad language of the
claim to a limitation which is not specifically stated therein, and is entitled to show
infringement by an equivalent structure which achieves the same result.” Id. at
1572.
21. Id. at 1574.
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function claim.
The most favored status of the means-plus-function limitation
did not last. In 1991, the Federal Circuit narrowed its
22
interpretation of such claims. In Laitram Corp., v. Rexnord, Inc., the
court held that claim differentiation could not be used as a tool to
make a means-plus-function claim open-ended by including
another claim specifically claiming the disclosed structure that
23
underlies the means clause. The Federal circuit followed this
position with its decision in Valmont Industries v. Reinke
24
Manufacturing Co. In Valmont the court found no infringement
under section 112, paragraph six because, while the function of the
accused infringing device and patented invention were identical,
25
their structures were not.
The court also harmonized its view on the interpretation of
26
means-plus-function claims with their examination at the PTO.
The court held in Donaldson that:
[t]he plain and unambiguous meaning of paragraph six is
that one construing means-plus-function language in a
claim must look to the specification and interpret that
language in light of the corresponding structure, material,
or acts described therein, and equivalents thereof, to the
extent that the specification provides such disclosure.
Paragraph six does not state or even suggest that the PTO
is exempt from this mandate, and there is no legislative
history indicating that Congress intended that the PTO
27
should be.
IV. HOW MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION LIMITATIONS ARE INFRINGED:
A UNIQUE ANALYSIS
The infringement analysis of means-plus-function limitations is
different from other types of claims limitations in that it requires
an additional layer of analysis. This section provides a context for
that analysis and for the estoppel analysis that follows.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1536.
Valmont Indus. Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1044.
In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1193.
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A. Patent Infringement Basics
28

The infringement analysis is a two-step process. The first step
is to perform a claim construction to determine the meaning of the
29
limitations in the claim. Because claim construction is a question
30
of law, the court must determine the meaning of the claims.
31
Typically, the courts choose to hold a Markman hearing.
The next step is to compare the claims as construed to the
32
accused device. The accused device must exhibit each and every
limitation of a claim before it is considered to infringe that claim. A
device may infringe either literally or under the doctrine of
equivalents. In either case, the evaluation of infringement is a
question of fact.
When the claim in question contains means-plus-function
terms, a specialized analysis must be performed. The theoretical
analysis of the law applied to means-plus-function is seemingly
straightforward. However, because the means-plus-function analysis
adds an extra layer of complexity to an already complex patent suit,
the application of these principles is often complex and confusing.
The analysis below is intended to supply an overview of the legal
analysis for infringement of means-plus-function claim limitations.
B. Ensuring That the Limitation in Question is in
Means-Plus-Function Format
The initial inquiry for means-plus-function claim limitations
ensures that the particular limitation is truly in means-plus-function
33
form. The form inquiry falls within the scope of claim
34
construction and is therefore a matter of law. The use of the term
“means” initially invokes the presumption that the limitation is in
35
means-plus-function form. The presumption of means-plusfunction can be rebutted if the limitation cites sufficient structure

28. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 970-71.
31. See generally id.
32. Id. at 976.
33. Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co., 208 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (citing Personalized Media Communications, LLC v. ITC, 161 F.3d 696, 702
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
34. Id. at 1359.
35. Id. at 1361 (citing Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 704 nn.9-10).
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36

to perform the claimed function. Conversely, if the limitation
does not use the term “means” then there is a presumption that the
37
This
term does not invoke means-plus-function form.
presumption can be rebutted by demonstrating that there is not
38
sufficient structure to perform the recited function.
C. Construction of Means-Plus-Function Claim Limitations
Determining the meaning of the claim limitation is the next
portion of the means-plus-function analysis. Means-plus-function
claims limitations have two discreet parts for the courts to
39
determine: function and corresponding structure. The function is
expressly set forth in the claim. Ordinary principles of construction
apply, meaning that one should look first at the intrinsic evidence
to determine any special or uncommon meaning attached to the
40
function. One would also look to the file history to determine if
41
there was any argument or amendment estoppel (Festo estoppel).
Next, the court must determine what, if any, structures are
disclosed for performing the claimed function. Terms that do not
adequately disclose structure for the claimed function are invalid
42
under section 112, paragraph two. The court examines the
structures disclosed in the specification that correspond to the
43
claimed function. In the case of computer software, for example,
the structure is the disclosed algorithm and not merely a
44
microprocessor programmed to perform the particular function.
The court must be careful to require only enough structure to
45
perform the claimed function; and avoid reading limitations into
36. Id.
37. Id.(citing Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 704 n.10).
38. Id.
39. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 (2001); Reiker Enters., Inc. v. Fan Brace, Inc., 243
F.3d 557 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 185 F.3d
1259, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
40. Kegel Co. v. AMF Bowling, Inc., 127 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
41. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558,
588 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2519 (June 18, 2001).
42. Kemco, 208 F.3d at 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing In re Donaldson, 16
F.3d 1189, 1195); see also 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2 (“The specification shall conclude
with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”).
43. Kemco, 208 F.3d at 1360.
44. WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech. 184 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
45. Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258 (Fed.
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46

the claim from the specification. In addition, the court must not
47
read functional or structural additions into the claim.
The court may also apply the principle of claim differentiation
48
when construing claims. Claim differentiation potentially factors
in the means-plus-function construction using a typical drafting
technique to place structure for the means-plus-function limitation
49
in other claims that depend on the base claim. Examination of
other claims may provide the “guidance and context for
interpreting a disputed means-plus-function limitation, especially if
50
they recite additional functions.” However, a means-plus-function
limitation is not made open-ended by the presence of another
51
claim containing structure for that limitation.
Finally, the court must look to the patent’s prosecution history,
also known as the file history or file wrapper, to see if any estoppel
52
was created during prosecution. The patent owner cannot reclaim
53
embodiments “disclaimed” during prosecution. This may be in
the form of prosecution history estoppel.
D. Literal Infringement of Means-Plus-Function Claims
After construing both the function and the disclosed structural
Cir. 1999) (citing Rodime PLC v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 174 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed.
Cir. 1999)).
46. The court in Kemco stated the following:
We are fully cognizant of the need to avoid reading limitations into a
claim from the specification. To that effect we have noted that: [T]his
court has consistently adhered to the proposition that courts cannot alter
what the patentee has chosen to claim as his invention, that limitations
appearing in the specification will not be read into claims, and that
interpreting what is meant by a word in a claim “is not to be confused
with adding an extraneous limitation appearing in the specification,
which is improper.
Kemco, 208 F.3d at 1362 (quoting Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 163 F.3d 1342,
1348, (Fed. Cir. 1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted)); see also
Wenger Mfg., Inc. v. Coating Mach. Sys., Inc., 239 F.3d 1225, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(citing Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Techs., Inc., 222 F.3d 958, 966 (Fed.
Cir. 2000)).
47. Wenger, 239 F.3d at 1233 (citing Micro Chem, 194 F.3d at 1258).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1233-34 (analyzing the application of claim differentiation in the
means-plus-function construction consideration).
50. Id. at 1234.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1238-39.
53. Id. at 1238 (citing Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d
850, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
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embodiments, one must determine whether the accused device
possesses the claim limitation in question. The accused device may
infringe literally or it may infringe under the doctrine of
equivalents. This section addresses the requirements of literal
infringement.
The literal infringement analysis can be broken down into two
54
components, function and structure. The function of the claim
55
limitation at issue must first be identical to the accused device. If
the structure is not identical, then the accused device does not
possess the means-plus-function limitation at issue.
The second part of the analysis is whether the structure of the
accused device is the same as the disclosed structure corresponding
56
to the claim limitation, or if it is a “literal” equivalent thereof.
Determining if the disclosed and accused structures are identical is
self-explanatory. But, if the two are not identical, then one must
determine if the two structures are “equivalent,” that is, if they are
57
insubstantially different within the meaning of § 112 ¶ 6.
A “literal” equivalent is different than an equivalent under the
58
doctrine of equivalents. The structure of the accused device, and
only the structure, must be insubstantially different than the
59
disclosed structure for the limitation in question.
One method of determining whether the two structures are
insubstantially different is to apply the modified function-way-result
test. Federal Circuit Judge Lourie first applied the modified
function-way-result test to the literal equivalent analysis in
60
Chiuminatta Concrete v. Cardinal Industries and subsequently
54. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 249 F.3d 1314, 1325
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
55. Id.; IMS Tech., Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1430 (Fed.
Cir. 2000); WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech. 184 F.3d 1339, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 179 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(citing Mas-Hamilton Group v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206, 1211-12 (Fed. Cir.
1998)).
56. Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1332 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (citing WMS Gaming, 184 F.3d at 1350).
57. Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co., 208 F.3d 1352, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (holding that an equivalent under §112 ¶ 6 (1) performs the identical
function and (2) is otherwise unsubstantially different with respect to structure).
58. Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Int’l Trading Co., 203 F.3d 1362, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
59. WMS Gaming, 184 F.3d at 1352.
60. Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d
1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[T]he structure in the accused device . . . operates in
a substantially different way compared with the structure of the claimed
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61

clarified the test in Kemco. In Odetics, Judge Clevenger stated, “As
we have noted, this tripartite test developed for the doctrine of
equivalents is not wholly transferable to the section 112, paragraph
62
six statutory equivalence context.”
The courts have observed that the “way” and “result” portions
63
of the test are the same in the doctrine of equivalents analysis.
However, equivalence is not a prisoner of a formula and is not an
64
absolute void of context. Therefore the modified function-wayresult test may not always be decisive in determining literal
65
equivalents.
E. Infringement of Means-Plus-Function Claims Under the Doctrine of
Equivalents
A claim limitation, not literally present in an accused device,
may still infringe under the doctrine of equivalents theory of
infringement. The doctrine of equivalents is a judicially created
66
doctrine and is based upon the courts inherent equitable powers.
The doctrine of equivalents applies where the accused device is
67
insubstantially different than the construed claim limitation.
Through its numerous decisions in the past few years, the Federal
Circuit has made it very clear that the doctrine of equivalents
68
applies to means-plus-function claim limitations.
A means-plus-function claim limitation infringes the doctrine
of equivalents if the accused device exhibits a feature that is
69
insubstantially different than the claim limitation at issue. The
Federal Circuit has recently been fond of using the function-way70
result test from Graver Tank. In the function-way-result test, the
device . . . .”).
61. Kemco Sales v. Control Paper Co., 208 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
62. Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 185 F.3d 1259, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
63. Kemco, 208 F.3d at 1364.
64. Id. n.6 (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S.
605, 609 (1950)).
65. Id.
66. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609.
67. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997)
(discussing Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 612).
68. WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech. 184 F.3d 1339, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir.
1999); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 249 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed.
Cir. 2001); Kemco, 208 F.3d at 1364; Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc.,
247 F.3d 1316, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
69. Kemco, 208 F.3d at 1364
70. Id. (citing Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608).
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accused device must perform substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result as
71
the accused structure. However, the function-way-result test is not
72
applicable to every situation. In some instances, the court may
look to other measures to determine the scope of permissible
equivalents such as known interchangeability by those skilled in the
73
art.
The practitioner should remember that the application of the
modified function-way-result test for literal equivalents and the
traditional function-way-result test for the doctrine of equivalents
are separate considerations. The difference between the two is that
the literal equivalents analysis requires an identical function while
the doctrine of equivalents requires the function to be
74
insubstantially different. The “way” and “result” prongs of the test
are identical. Therefore, the doctrine of equivalents is slightly
broader in scope than literal equivalents.
V. PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL
Prosecution history estoppel manifests itself in two different
contexts: claim construction and infringement under the doctrine
75
of equivalents. Argument estoppel narrows the scope of a claim
76
limitation that is construed by the court as a matter of law.
Amendment estoppel prevents a patentee from recapturing subject
77
matter surrendered during the prosecution of a patent.
A. Argument Estoppel
Argument estoppel is based on the public policy behind
notice—that potential infringers are entitled to rely on the public
78
record of a patent in determining its meaning and scope.
Argument estoppel is formed from arguments made during the
71. Id.
72. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 36.
73. Kemco at 1364-65.
74. Id.
75. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space Systems/Loral, Inc., 249 F.3d 1314
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Southwall Tech., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
76. See Southwall Tech., 54 F.3d at 1576.
77. See Lockheed Martin, 249 F.3d at 1326.
78. See Lemelson v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(“Other players in the marketplace are entitled to rely on the evidence of record
made in the patent office in determining the meaning and scope of the patent.”).
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prosecution of a patent by the applicant in order to obtain
79
allowance. The “[a]rguments and amendments made during the
prosecution of a patent and other aspects of the prosecution
history, as well as the specification and other claims, must be
80
examined to determine the meaning of the terms in the claims.”
Notice requires that disclaimed subject matter cannot be
reclaimed through charges of infringement. “The prosecution
history limits the interpretation of the claim terms so as to exclude
any interpretation that was disclaimed during prosecution . . . .
Claims may not be construed one way in order to obtain their
81
allowance and in a different way against accused infringers.” It is
irrelevant whether the assertions were necessary to secure
82
allowance.
Finally, “arguments made during prosecution
regarding the meaning of a claim term are relevant to the
interpretation of that term in every claim of the patent absent a
83
clear indication to the contrary.”
84

B. Amendment (Festo) Estoppel

A patentee may limit the scope of the doctrine of equivalents
during prosecution because a patentee cannot recapture subject
85
matter surrendered during the prosecution of the patent. Such
estoppel may arise by either amendments made to overcome prior
art rejections, or by arguments made to secure allowance of a

79. See Southwall Tech., 54 F.3d at 1576 (“Claims may not be construed one
way in order to obtain their allowance and in a different way against accused
infringers.”).
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing ZMI Corp. v. Cardiac Resuscitator Corp., 844 F.2d 1576, 1580
(Fed. Cir. 1988)).
82. Id. at 1583.
83. Id. at 1579.
84. The reader is cautioned that the Festo holding is a very controversial one
among practitioners. It has spawned considerable debate and was granted
certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court. 121 S. Ct. 2519 (2001). Therefore, it is
possible that the Federal Circuit’s en banc holding in Festo will be overruled.
Regardless of that outcome, the analysis still involves a determination of the
subject matter disclaimed by the patent applicant. Prior to Festo, this analysis was
referred to as the flexible bar. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558, 573-75 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct.
2519 (June 18, 2001).
85. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space Systems/Loral, Inc., 249 F.3d 1314, 1326
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,
31-32 (1997)).

07ULBRICH.DOC

2002]

3/4/2002 1:22 PM

FESTO AND CLAIMS LIMITATIONS

1179

86

claim.
The first step in an amendment estoppel analysis is to
determine which claim limitations are allegedly infringed by
87
equivalents. The court must next determine whether an
amendment was made concerning the limitation at issue during
88
the prosecution of the patent. If the claim limitation at issue was
amended, the court must determine whether the amendment
89
narrowed the scope of the claim. If the amendment did narrow
the claim’s scope, prosecution history estoppel will bar the
application of the doctrine of equivalents to the claim limitation
unless the patent holder establishes that the amendment was made
90
for a purpose unrelated to patentability. When prosecution
history estoppel exists for a claim limitation, that limitation has no
range of equivalents available, and infringement under the
91
doctrine of equivalents is impossible. In addition, “the court still
may need to consider whether statements made during prosecution
92
give rise to argument-based estoppel.”

86. Festo, 234 F.3d at 586.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. A claim is narrowed if it is narrower in any respect, even though it may
also be otherwise broadened in some respects. Voluntary amendments are also
treated the same as other amendments. Therefore, a voluntary amendment of a
limitation that narrows the scope of a claim for a reason related to patentability is
subject to estoppel. See id. at 568. Narrowing may also include the swapping of
means-plus-function limitations for an identical structural limitation because the
means-plus-function limitation is broader by encompassing equivalents to the
latter claimed structure. See id. at 589.
90. Id. at 566-67 (holding that for determining whether an amendment gives
rise to prosecution history estoppel, a “substantial reason related to patentability”
is not limited to overcoming or avoiding the prior art, but instead includes any
reason which relates to the statutory requirements for a patent). Substantial
reasons to patentability include 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 112 issues as well as 35 U.S.C.
§§ 102 and 103 issues. An amendment made for purposes of “clarifying” the
claims; any other voluntary purpose is sufficient to create prosecution history
estoppel. Id. at 568. An amendment without an explanation is assumed to be for
patentability purposes. Id. at 578.
91. Id. at 569 (“When a claim amendment creates prosecution history
estoppel with regard to a claim element, there is no range of equivalents available
for the amended claim element. Application of the doctrine of equivalents to the
claim element is completely barred (a ‘complete bar’).”).
92. Id.
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VI. APPLICATION OF ARGUMENT ESTOPPEL TO
MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION CLAIM LIMITATIONS
The Federal Circuit has established clear precedent for
applying argument estoppel to means-plus-function claim
93
94
limitations. In Cybor, the Federal Circuit held that prosecution
history is relevant to the construction of a claim in means-plus95
function form. The court explained that if a patent owner’s
position on construction of a means-plus-function claim limitation
is inconsistent with that argued during prosecution, it may create
an estoppel just as such arguments may create an equivalents
96
estoppel under the doctrine of equivalents. Therefore, clear
assertions in support of patentability may affect the range of
97
equivalents under section 112, paragraph six.
Disclaimer of structure cannot be later asserted against an
accused infringer. “Statements made during the prosecution
relating to structures disclosed in the specification are certainly
relevant to determining the meaning of the means-plus-function
98
limitations of the claims at issue.” If an applicant specifically
distinguishes a structure from what is claimed during prosecution,
the applicant will be estopped from asserting a scope for the same
99
claim that covers that structure.
The inquiry relevant to creating such estoppel is “whether a
competitor would reasonably believe that the applicant had
100
surrendered the relevant subject matter.” It is helpful to analyze
the application of this literal equivalents estoppel to illustrate the
willingness of the courts to narrow or even eliminate the range of
literal equivalents under certain circumstances.
93. See, e.g., Wenger Mfg., Inc. v. Coating Mach. Sys., Inc., 239 F.3d 1225, 1225
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 102 F.3d 1214, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
94. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
95. Id. at 1457 (citing United States v. Telectronics Inc., 857 F.2d 778, 782
(Fed. Cir. 1988)).
96. Id. (“[J]ust as prosecution history estoppel may act to estop an
equivalence argument under the doctrine of equivalents, positions taken before
the PTO may bar an inconsistent position on claim construction under § 112,
¶ 6.”).
97. Id. (“Clear assertions in support of patentability thus may affect the range
of equivalents under § 112, ¶ 6.”).
98. Alpex, 102 F.3d at 1220.
99. Id. at 1221 (citing Sofamor Daneck Group, Inc. v. DePuy-Motech, Inc., 74
F.3d 1216, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
100. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1457.
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101

In Cybor,
one of the claim terms at issue was “second
102
pumping means.” The court examined the file history and the
prior art reference and determined that the district court properly
did not limit the scope of these terms because the prosecution
history statements cannot be interpreted as precluding every type
103
of external reservoir. The disclaimed subject matter is narrowly
interpreted to be a physically unattached reservoir that has
104
independent functionality.
Cybor also attempted to use the same estoppel arguments to
105
avoid infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. The court
found Cybor’s arguments unpersuasive for the same reasons that it
106
cited for plaintiff’s section 112, paragraph six arguments.
107
In Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., defendant Nintendo
argued that its gaming system did not infringe Alpex’s patent
because Nintendo used a shift register rather than the RAM
108
memory map that the Alpex patent required. Nintendo argued
that the term “means responsive” in the Alpex patent is limited to a
109
RAM based, bit-map video display structure. The court found that
101. Cybor was a declaratory action wherein Cybor sued defendant FAS for a
declaration of non-infringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,167,837. See id. at 1451.
102. Id. at 1456. The plaintiff contended that these terms could not cover any
reservoir for accumulating fluid that is external to the second pump because the
defendant argued to overcome an obviousness rejection stating that the prior art
reference did not provide a separate container for collecting permeate or teach
the collection of fluid in a second pumping means. Id. at 1457.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1460.
106. Id. (“The inventor’s statements to the PTO regarding the Storkebaum
reference, given the marked differences between the reference and the patented
and accused devices, do not show the deliberate unequivocal surrender of all
external reservoirs.”)
107. Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 102 F.3d 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
108. Id. at 1219.
109. Id. The Alpex court explained that during prosecution relative to
overcoming a prior art reference:
Applicants' display system utilizes a random access memory (RAM) which
is under the control of a micro-processor. . . . The random access
capability is important since this enables the selected image device to be
located directly in any desired area of the RAM.
Okuda, in contrast, does not use a random access memory but, instead,
employs a series of shift registers as his refresh memory which
corresponds to applicants' RAM. Because random access to the shift
registers is not possible, Okuda is unable to selectively modify a single bit
in the memory but, instead, must operate on a line at a time to modify
the stored display data.
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the district court, in adopting the recommendations of the special
master, did not expressly consider the prosecution history
110
Alpex countered that such
statements of the applicant.
statements were not made with respect to the claims Nintendo
111
allegedly infringed. However, the court found Alpex’s arguments
112
unpersuasive. The court observed that the “statements made by
Alpex during prosecution with regard to the Okuda prior art
patent emphasize that Alpex claimed a video display system based
on the use of RAM capable of modifying a single bit, or pixel, on
113
the television receiver.” Because of the distinguished prior art
and the fact that the defendant used the same structural and
functional traits, Alpex’s claims could not cover defendant’s
114
device.
The Federal Circuit has recently clarified its position on the
application of argument estoppel to the literal infringement
115
analysis. In Wenger Manufacturing v. Coating Machinery Systems, the
defendant argued that prosecution history estoppel precluded a
finding of infringement by a machine that does not recirculate
116
air. The Wenger court observed that, “[t]his court has previously
stated that the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel is

Id. (citations omitted).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1220.
[T]he prosecution history of all claims is not insulated from review in
connection with determining the fair scope of [a] claim . . . . To hold
otherwise would be to exalt form over substance and distort the logic of
this jurisprudence, which serves as an effective and useful guide to the
understanding of patent claims.
Id. (quoting Builders Concrete, Inc. v. Bremerton Concrete Prods. Co., 757 F.2d
255, 260 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
113. Id. at 1220.
114. Id. at 1221. It is also important to note that the special verdict form to the
jury inquired, “[D]o you find that claims 12 and 13 require a structure that
includes a display RAM which has discrete storage positions which correspond to
each of the bars or pixels of the TV screen?” Since the jury answered in the
affirmative, it was clear that the jury’s findings were inconsistent with the correct
claim interpretation.
115. 239 F.3d 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
116. Id. at 1238. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff created the estoppel
by amending the claims to overcome an anticipatory, prior-art-based rejection and
corresponding argument. The court did not consider such argument because it
was contained in an amendment not entered into the file wrapper. However, the
court did agree that the plaintiff did distinguish the prior art reference based on
its lack of a housing through argument in the prosecution history. Id.
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‘irrelevant’ to the determination of literal claim scope.” The
court recognized that there is a clear distinction between using
prosecution history to construe disputed claim language, and
applying the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel to prevent a
patentee from obtaining under the doctrine of equivalents
coverage of subject matter that was relinquished during
118
prosecution.
However, the court addressed the application of prosecution
history estoppel to the literal analysis of infringement for meansplus-function claim limitations stating:
[J]ust as prosecution history estoppel may act to estop an
equivalence argument under the doctrine of equivalents,
positions taken before the PTO may bar an inconsistent
119
position on claim construction under § 112, ¶ 6.
The Wenger court then reiterated that the relevant inquiry is
whether a competitor would reasonably believe that the applicant
120
had surrendered the relevant subject matter.
The rules of law from these three leading cases on the
application of prosecution history estoppel to literal equivalents
can be synthesized into a few basic guidelines. First, prosecution
history can create an estoppel that can narrow the application of
literal equivalents for means-plus-function claim limitations.
Second, the disclaimer must be reasonably explicit.
In Cybor and Wenger, the Federal Circuit did not apply estoppel,
but did so in Alpex. The clear difference between these two findings
is that the defending parties in Cybor and Alpex were asking the
court to infer a disclaimer based upon prior art that did not
contain the same elements as the accused devices. In Alpex, the
accused product had the same element as the prior art.
This leads to a third guideline. The more the accused product
is similar to the prior art that forms the basis of an estoppel
argument, the more likely the court is going to accept such an
argument. In this sense, the best position that defendants could
117. Id. at 1239 (citing Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d
850, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1239 (quoting Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1457
(Fed. Cir. 1998)) (omissions in original).
120. Id. The applicant had only distinguished the prior art reference based on
its lack of a housing, not on its inability to recirculate air. The court found that no
reasonable competitor skilled in the art could conclude that the applicant
surrendered coverage of machines that do not recirculate air. Id.
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have is where they were actually practicing the prior art that is the
basis of an estoppel argument.
VII. APPLICATION OF AMENDMENT (FESTO) ESTOPPEL TO
MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION CLAIM LIMITATIONS
The application of amendment estoppel to means-plusfunction claim limitations is a two-part analysis owing to the
presence of equivalents in both the literal and doctrine of
equivalents contexts. The first part is the application of equivalents
under the doctrine of equivalents. This application is very
straightforward and has been applied recently by the Federal
Circuit to preclude infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
121
the court
In Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space Systems / Loral Inc.,
applied the analysis as outlined above to determine that
amendment estoppel was invoked, thereby making equivalents
under the doctrine of equivalents unavailable for a means-plusfunction claim limitation. Therefore, it is clear that amendment
estoppel can bar the application of the doctrine of equivalents to a
means-plus-function limitation.
The more difficult question is whether amendment estoppel
also eliminates all literal equivalents under section 112 paragraph
six. The Federal Circuit has not yet addressed this issue; although it
122
easily could have in Lockheed. In that case, however, both parties
agreed that there could be no literal infringement so the issue was
123
no longer pending before the court. Because the Federal Circuit
has not given any guidance on the application of amendment
estoppel to literal equivalents, one must use analogies to the
doctrine of equivalents and public policy to predict the likely
outcome of attempts to eliminate all equivalents from means-plusfunction claim limitations.
The first sub-issue is whether the Federal Circuit has the power
to override the statutory language under certain circumstances.
This issue likely turns on whether section 112, paragraph six is
constitutional. Such analysis is beyond the scope of this article.
However, the language of the statute does not explicitly provide a
124
definition or test for such equivalents. Therefore, it is likely that
121. 249 F.3d 1314, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1325.
124. Of course, one could argue that the Supreme Court laid out a clear
mandate in Graver Tank, 339 U.S. 605 (1950). However, the issues in that case did
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the court has the ability to define the scope of available equivalents
under some circumstances so narrowly that it is defacto eliminated.
The second sub-issue is whether the Federal Circuit should
eliminate literal equivalents under certain common circumstances.
The public policy behind notice seems to demand such
elimination. In fact, means-plus-function claim limitations
inherently violate the notice policy because a potential infringer
cannot clearly predict the scope of claims containing such
language. The potential infringer can only rely on the intrinsic
evidence, which does not define the scope of equivalents.
Moreover, the analyses applied to the structural equivalents of
means-plus-function claim limitations and the structural analysis
125
under the doctrine of equivalents are identical. The question is
whether the doctrine of equivalents permits an extension of the
structural scope beyond the scope provided by literal equivalents.
Logically, the scope of the two is the same because each is applied
to the claimed/described structures concurrently, and not
consecutively. The case law does not show an application of the
analysis where the court first construed the literal equivalents and
then evaluated the equivalents of the literal equivalents under the
guise of the doctrine. Therefore, one could argue that it is illogical
to permit the same scope of structural equivalents when that same
scope of equivalents is not permitted under the doctrine of
equivalents due to amendment estoppel.
However, one cannot escape the effect of codification of the
126
literal equivalents inherent to means-plus-function claims.
Because literal equivalents are provided by statute, the same
equitable principles that bar the application of the doctrine of
equivalents may not be relevant to the literal equivalents
consideration. The statute provides notice to potential infringers
that literal equivalents apply to means-plus-function claims. One
could argue that short of a clear disclaimer, the scope of literal
equivalents is the full scope potentially available. This is analogous
to the flexible bar approach to the doctrine of equivalents analysis
in the pre-Festo era of patent law.
There are potential arguments to be made both in support of,
and in opposition to, the elimination of literal equivalents due to
not involve means-plus-function claim language but, rather, involved only the
doctrine of equivalents.
125. Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co., 208 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
126. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (2001).
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the application of amendment estoppel. The Federal Circuit has
not provided the courts or the legal community with any guidance
on the subject. The application of public policy and analogies are
of no guidance to help predict the possible outcome of a court’s
decision on the issue. One can only hope that when the Supreme
Court addresses this issue in its consideration of the Federal
Circuit’s Festo decision, it will either clarify this quandary or
eliminate the issue by reinstating the old flexible bar approach.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Means-plus-function claim limitations are frequently used in
patent claims. Therefore, both patent prosecutors and litigators
must be well versed in the construction of such specialized claim
language. They must also be able to review prosecution file
histories and apply prosecution history estoppel to determine the
scope of claims containing means-plus-function language to predict
the likelihood of infringement for their clients. The Federal Circuit
has provided a body of law to guide these entities in their
evaluation of the means-plus-function construction, infringement
and argument estoppel analyses. However, there is only speculation
and conjecture surrounding the application of amendment
estoppel to means-plus-function claims. The Federal Circuit is
issuing new decisions with respect to means-plus-function claims on
a regular basis, and it is only a matter of time before this issue is
addressed head-on or rendered moot by the Supreme Court’s
much anticipated Festo ruling.

